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Coalition negotiations are continuing in Germany, following federal elections in September. André
Krouwel, Theresa Eckert and Yordan Kutiyski use each of the major parties’ manifesto pledges
to illustrate the state of the German party system in 2013. They note that the party system has
become more polarised, with an ‘empty centre’ between those on the left and right of the political
spectrum. The distance between Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU and the SPD gives an indication of the
difficulty involved in forming a governing coalition. By analysing German voters’ party preferences
and issue positions, they also provide a preliminary explanation of why the FDP failed to enter
parliament for the first time in the party´s history.
Germany’s Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) achieved an impressive result in the September federal election,
gaining 41.5 per cent of the vote and thus recording the best result since the unification election in 1990, when CDU
leader Helmut Kohl was at the height of his popularity. The social democratic SPD, on the other hand, recovered
only slightly since their worst-ever election result in 2009 and received just over a quarter of the popular vote. This
makes the CDU/CSU the dominant force in the Bundestag with 311 seats compared to the 193 representatives of
the SPD. The Christian Democrats came up 5 seats short of an outright single party majority, yet their traditional
coalition partner the FDP failed to reach the five per cent electoral threshold.
Clearly, government formation will be problematic. The Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats seem
condemned to one another. To form a coalition, Angela Merkel has to reach out to the SPD, with negotiations likely to
be protracted given the enormous policy differences between the two parties. The German political landscape is
profoundly polarised after several years of economic crisis and austerity policies. Both the CDU/CSU and the SPD
will have to abandon pledges that they made during the campaign to find some middle ground.
Of course, Merkel can claim that the austerity policies she has been implementing have received the blessing of the
German voters, given the enormous increase in the CDU’s vote-share in the elections. Nevertheless, her coalition
partner the FDP did not pass the 5 per cent electoral threshold for the first time in the post-war period. Now Merkel
needs to deal with the SPD – after coalition talks with the Greens were amicably dismissed – to form a majority.
Needless to say, the bargaining power of the SPD is considerable. Moreover, due to the failure of other right-wing or
conservative parties to enter parliament, there is a small left-wing majority in the Bundestag. The likely grand
coalition (SPD and CDU/CSU) would combine a vast 504 out of the 631 seats in German parliament, leaving only a
strikingly small, and thus weaker opposition of Die Linke and the Greens.
German political landscape
For this election we developed a Voting Advice Application (VAA) “ Bundeswahlkompass”, in which we positioned all
relevant parties on 30 of the most salient issues, based on the official party stances in their manifestos. This party
calibration can help us to understand where the parties agree and where they differ in their party programmes. It
also allows us, by way of aggregating these party stances over the main political dimensions, to show the
polarisation of the German party system in 2013. These centrifugal tendencies and the FDP´s vanishing from
parliament will make coalition formation an arduous task.
The German political parties were positioned along two main political dimensions: an economic left-right dimension
and the cultural ‘progressive-conservative’ dimension. As Figure 1 illustrates, the striking clustering of the parties of
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the left and the substantial distance of all parties from the centre is immediately visible.
Figure 1: German political landscape
 Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU)     Social Democrats (SPD)    Die Linke
 Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen)    Free Democrats (FDP)      AfD
 Pirate Party of Germany (Piraten)     National Democratic Party (NPD)
Source: Bundeswahlkompass
The empty German centre
The CDU/CSU are uncharacteristically distant from the centre and positioned to the right on the socio-economic
dimension. The SPD are located far from the centre as well and are situated close to the two other main left-wing
parties: The Greens and Die Linke. The centre space is completely empty: a political ‘no man’s land’. The partisan
polarity shows that the famous centrist tendencies of the German ‘Volksparteien’ – that Otto Kirchheimer referred to
as ‘catch-all parties’ or “Allerweltsparteien’ – no longer exists in 2013.
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A strong political polarisation is visible on both the economic and cultural dimension. For example, on the economic
dimension there is a clear divide between the left and the right. Figure 2 illustrates one example of this, with
reference to the issue of introducing a national minimum wage. While the parties on the left are in favour of the
policy, the parties on the right are vehemently opposed to it.
Figure 2: Positions of German parties on the statement: “A national minimum wage should be introduced”
Source: Bundeswahlkompass
Next to political polarisation on the economic dimension, German parties are also deeply divided over cultural
issues. For example, on the topic of dual citizenship (see Figure 3) we can see a clear rift between the conservative
parties (CDU/CSU, AfD and NPD) and the progressive-libertarian parties (FDP, SPD, Die Linke, Pirate Party, and the
Greens). Both these issues are part of 10 demands that the SPD has recently voiced as crucial for a coalition
formation. This signifies the deep differences between the possible coalition partners of the SPD and CDU/CSU, and
shows the difficulties both parties will face when they jointly enter into government.
Figure 3: Positions of German parties on the statement: “Dual citizenship should not be accepted”
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Source: Bundeswahlkompass
The strange disappearance of the FDP
This polarisation in Germany seems to have had the most serious impact on the Free Democratic Party (FDP). In
the past, the Liberals were able to govern with either the Christian Democrats or the Social Democrats. Now the
party seems to have been politically derailed by the centrifugal pull of the current political constellations, and has
failed to pass the 5 per cent threshold. The FDP thus lost nearly 10 per cent of its vote share compared to the
federal election in 2009 and is no longer represented in parliament. This is particularly striking since the Liberals had
been represented in parliament since the founding of the Bundesrepublik in 1949 and were part and parcel of the
political establishment. In fact, the 2009 election gave them the largest seat share in their history. Four years on, this
has all evaporated.
The FDP also has a longer record of government participation than any other German party. For a total of 46 years
the FDP was in government, mostly in coalition with the Christian Democrats, but also with the Social Democrats,
and can thus be considered to have played a pivotal role in German government formation. The complete
disappearance of the Liberals from parliament in 2013 is clearly a unique historic development, both for the party
itself as well as for the German political landscape.
During the election campaign the “Bundeswahlkompass” was promoted through social network media and the
German newspaper Tagesspiegel, with more than a quarter of a million Germans filling out the 30 issue questions.
We also asked visitors to answer a small number of relevant background questions, which around 20,000 users did.
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Of these, more than 1,700 German voters indicated that they voted for the FDP in the 2009 Bundestag election.
When we look at these former FDP voters, we see that more than 40 per cent indicate that they now support a
different party (see Figure 4).
We asked all respondents to indicate how likely it was that they would ever vote for each of the relevant parties
ranging from 1 (highly unlikely) to 10 (highly likely). Only 27 per cent of those who voted for the Liberals in 2009
were now still determined to do so (given that they gave the FDP a maximum score of 10). While we may assume
that those who gave a score of 9 or 8 were also seriously considering the Liberals, it is clear that support for the FDP
has decreased substantially among their previous supporters.
Figure 4: Likelihood of those who voted for the FDP in 2009 voting for the FDP again in 2013
Note: The figure shows the responses of 2009 FDP voters to the question “How likely would
you be to vote for the FDP in 2013?” on a scale from 1-10 (1 being the least likely, 10 being
the most likely).
Source: Bundeswahlkompass
The figures also indicate that a quarter of FDP supporters in 2009 now say it is very unlikely that they will vote for
the FDP. With only just over a quarter of the liberal voters remaining loyal, we need to examine where these liberal
defectors are moving.
As Figure 5 illustrates, the CDU/CSU and the AfD were particularly likely (scores of 8, 9 or 10) to receive support
from former FDP voters. In fact, almost 45 per cent of former FDP voters were seriously considering voting for
CDU/CSU. This comes as no surprise as many centre-right voters in Germany traditionally have high vote
propensities for both the Liberals and the Christian Democrats, and often split their vote between them.
Nevertheless, it is fairly noteworthy when half of a party’s previous voters would strongly consider voting for an
opponent.
Figure 5: Parties which FDP supporters in 2009 would be strongly likely to support in 2013
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Note: The figures show the percentage of 2009 FDP voters who gave responses of “8, 9 or
10” to the question “How likely would you be to vote for this party in the 2013 elections?”
Source: Bundeswahlkompass
Even more startling is the enormous appeal that the new Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party had on liberal
voters. A quarter of former FDP supporters indicated that they would seriously consider voting for the AfD, a party
that is far more Eurosceptic and in favour of restricting immigration than the FDP. While 58 per cent of liberal
supporters from 2009 were still considering the FDP, it also emerges that three out of four liberal supporters were
seriously contemplating another option. This indicates the difficulty the FDP had in convincing their core supporters
to remain loyal.
We can also assess whether there was any effect of the personal appeal of party leaders, as we also asked all
respondents to tell us how competent they thought the various party leaders were. Figure 6 shows that many former
FDP voters think Angela Merkel is much more competent than the FDP’s leader, Rainer Brüderle. This may not be
as surprising as our finding that many also think SPD leader Peer Steinbrück is more competent than the Liberal
party leader. In fact, many former liberal voters even consider newcomer Bernd Lucke, leader of the Eurosceptic
AfD, more competent than Brüderle. These figures do not lie: the FDP had an important leadership problem. Many
of their core voters seemed to consider the leaders of three other parties more competent than Brüderle.
Figure 6: Responses from 2009 FDP voters to the question: “How competent do you think the following
politicians are?”
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Note: Responses are on a scale from 1-10 (1 being least competent, 10 being the most
competent).
Source: Bundeswahlkompass
Which voters abandoned the FDP?
When some standard background variables are considered, it is apparent that the FDP lost support from older
voters and female voters in particular. This should be worrying for the Liberals, as this means that their traditional
core vote could be disappearing. Those voters who remained loyal to the FDP tended to be the higher educated and
those in higher income brackets. It is even more worrying for the Liberals that voters with a more right-wing
orientation were contemplating a different party. In that sense, the FDP lost support from those who are in favour of
more restrictive immigration policies. The anti-immigration factor seems to have had a significant role in reducing the
party’s overall support. It seems that the liberals were haemorrhaging support on all sides.
Defection from the FDP also results from a more general dissatisfaction with the way that German democracy
currently functions. Former FDP voters that were generally dissatisfied with German democracy and favoured a
‘strong-hand’ leader were also less likely to remain loyal to the Liberals. As shown above, the unpopularity of the
FDP leadership also drove voters away from the party into the hands of – in their eyes – more competent politicians
like Angela Merkel.
Since we asked voters for their opinion on a large number of relevant issues, we can also see which issues
encouraged voters to abandon the FDP. On the economic dimension, former FDP supporters who object to the use
of public money to rescue private banks largely switched their support to other parties, such as the AfD. Moreover,
those who supported increasing financial support for the unemployed, increasing the top rate of tax, and introducing
a minimum wage were also less likely to vote for the FDP. This suggests that the party not only lost support from
those with firm right-wing views, but also among centrist voters, who shifted their support to other parties, in
particular the SPD.
On the cultural dimension, the more Eurosceptic segment of former FDP voters now had a much more vocal anti-
European option to support in the shape of the AfD, which advocated an end to financial support for southern
European countries, and the reintroduction of the Deutsche Mark. Some more libertarian voters also switched
support from the FDP to the SPD, particularly those in favour of closing nuclear power plants and ending the
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involvement of the German armed forces in military operations overseas. Former FDP voters with more
conservative views, such as those opposing the legalisation of cannabis and adoption rights for same-sex couples,
also shifted their support to the CDU/CSU. Given that the party was abandoned by libertarian, conservative, and
Eurosceptic voters, it will not be easy to draft a platform in future elections that will automatically appeal to these
three different voter groups and regain the support they attracted in 2009.
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